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Abstract
Canine rabies transmission was interrupted in N’Djame´na, Chad, following two mass vacci-
nation campaigns. However, after nine months cases resurged with re-establishment of
endemic rabies transmission to pre-intervention levels. Previous analyses investigated
district level spatial heterogeneity of vaccination coverage, and dog density; and importa-
tion, identifying the latter as the primary factor for rabies resurgence. Here we assess the
impact of individual level heterogeneity on outbreak probability, effectiveness of vaccination
campaigns and likely time to resurgence after a campaign. Geo-located contact sensors
recorded the location and contacts of 237 domestic dogs in N’Djame´na over a period of 3.5
days. The contact network data showed that urban dogs are socially related to larger com-
munities and constrained by the urban architecture. We developed a network generation
algorithm that extrapolates this empirical contact network to networks of large dog popula-
tions and applied it to simulate rabies transmission in N’Djame´na. The model predictions
aligned well with the rabies incidence data. Using the model we demonstrated, that major
outbreaks are prevented when at least 70% of dogs are vaccinated. The probability of a
minor outbreak also decreased with increasing vaccination coverage, but reached zero only
when coverage was near total. Our results suggest that endemic rabies in N’Djame´na may
be explained by a series of importations with subsequent minor outbreaks. We show that
highly connected dogs hold a critical role in transmission and that targeted vaccination of
such dogs would lead to more efficient vaccination campaigns.
Author summary
Rabies transmission between dogs and from dogs to humans can be interrupted by mass
vaccination of dogs. Novel geo-referenced contact sensors tracked the contacts and loca-
tions of several hundred dogs in N’Djame´na, the capital of Chad. With the data generated
PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680 August 1, 2018 1 / 18
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Laager M, Mbilo C, Madaye EA, Naminou
A, Le´chenne M, Tschopp A, et al. (2018) The
importance of dog population contact network
structures in rabies transmission. PLoS Negl Trop
Dis 12(8): e0006680. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pntd.0006680
Editor: Charles E Rupprecht, Wistar Institute,
UNITED STATES
Received: March 2, 2018
Accepted: July 10, 2018
Published: August 1, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Laager et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper and its Supporting Information
files.
Funding: This work was supported by the Swiss
National Science Foundation under grant number
310030 160067 and the UK National Institute for
Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection
Research Unit (HPRU) in Modelling Methodology
(HPRU-2012-10080) at Imperial College London,
in partnership with Public Health England. The
Freiwillige Akademische Gesellschaft (http://www.
by the sensors we developed a contact network model for rabies transmission dynamics.
The model results compared well to incidence data. The model explains the relationship
between vaccination campaigns and number of cases better than previous models. Highly
connected dogs play a critical role in rabies transmission and targeted vaccination of these
dogs would lead to more efficient vaccination campaigns.
Introduction
The viral disease rabies, transmitted between mammals through bites, is fatal following the
onset of symptoms. Although human rabies can be prevented by appropriate post-exposure
prophylaxis (PEP), approximately 60,000 people die annually from rabies, mainly in Africa
and Asia, [1]. The main source of exposure for human rabies is the domestic dog, so vaccinat-
ing dogs is an effective way of reducing rabies transmission among dogs and from dogs to
humans [2, 3].
Rabies is endemic in N’Djame´na, the capital city of Chad, with an average incidence of one
laboratory-confirmed infected dog per week [4]. A deterministic model of rabies transmission
predicted that mass vaccination of dogs would be sufficient to interrupt transmission for six
years [2]. Vaccination campaigns in dogs were conducted in 2012 and 2013, with both cam-
paigns exceeding 70% coverage [5]. Rabies transmission was interrupted in January 2014 after
the second vaccination campaign [3], but there was a resurgence of cases nine months later.
Subsequent analyses considered reasons for the quick resurgence, including spatial heteroge-
neity of vaccination coverage, and dog density; underreporting of cases; and importation. Sim-
ulation results from a deterministic metapopulation model suggested that importation was the
most likely reason for the case resurgence [6]. Although deterministic models can predict the
effect of large scale vaccination campaigns and the overall population dynamics, they do not
adequately capture effects of stochasticity in low level endemic settings. This becomes impor-
tant towards the end of an elimination campaign or upon re-establishment after interruption
of transmission [7]. Previous models did not include fine scale heterogeneity at the individual
level or the network structure of dog to dog contacts.
The importance of including host contact structure in infectious disease modelling has
been highlighted in many studies [8–10]. Theoretical analysis of epidemic processes on graphs
has shown that the basic reproductive ratio not only depends on the expected value but also
on the standard deviation of the degree distribution of the graph [11] and that on scale-free
networks diseases can spread and persist independently of the spreading rate [12]. These theo-
retical insights led to better understanding of disease transmission dynamics for different dis-
eases, including pertussis [13], influenza [14], severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [15],
human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) [16]
and gonorrhea [17], and inspired novel control measures such as acquaintance immunization
[18], contact tracing [19] and ring vaccination [20, 21].
Due to the substantial influence of network structure on disease transmission dynamics,
many studies have collected data on host interactions. Human contact network models are
generally established using contact diaries [22–24], proximity loggers [25–28], video recording
[29] or mobile phones [30]. Contacts have also been studied in a wide range of animal species.
The most common method for measuring animal contacts is behavioral observation, but other
methods such as radio tracking, Global Positioning System (GPS) trackers, proximity loggers
or powder marking are also utilized [31].
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In the past decades, several rabies models with host contact structure have been published.
White et al. [32] simulated fox movement pathways using home range size estimates, data
from radio tracking and behavioral encounter observations to estimate contact probabilities
for different seasons and fox densities. They found that the rabies front set off by an incursion
of rabies into a healthy population moved more slowly than in a previous model of homoge-
neous fox populations. Including contact behavior in the model also resulted in a substantially
higher predicted rabies control success rate. Hirsch et al. [33] used data from 30 raccoons fitted
with proximity loggers to assess properties of the raccoon contact network. Unlike in earlier
radiotelemetry studies, they found a highly connected population and discussed possible
implications of the social network on the spread of rabies. Reynolds et al. [34] used proximity
logger data from 15 raccoons to build a contact network model of 90 raccoons and simulate
rabies spread. They studied the effects of seasonality, differences in vaccination coverage and
impact of behavioral changes in infected raccoons on disease spread. Du¨rr and Ward [35] used
a contact network model of rabies transmission among owned free-roaming dogs in Australia
to estimate the impact of a hypothetical rabies incursion from Indonesia. They differentiated
transmission within households, between households and between communities. The proba-
bility of between household transmission was based on GPS data from 69 dogs, while between
community transmission was estimated using questionnaire data. Johnstone-Robertson et al.
[36] developed a contact network model for rabies in the wild dog population in Australia.
They constructed a function for dog contact probabilities, using a wide range of different val-
ues to generate contact networks and then implemented a rabies transmission model based on
parameters from literature.
However, individual based models of dog rabies transmission in endemic settings are lack-
ing, so this study equipped 300 dogs in N’Djame´na with purpose developed geo-referenced
contact sensors. This is the first study to collect contact data among dogs as well as the first to
integrate contact data from such a large subset of an animal population into a rabies model.
The individual based model of rabies transmission we developed includes distance between
home locations and a degree distribution fit to a contact network structure of dogs in N’Dja-
me´na. We compared our model results to 2016 outbreak data from two quarters of N’Dja-
mena. We examined the re-establishment probability of rabies over different vaccination
coverage and compared outbreak probability over time with rabies incidence in N’Djame´na
from 2012 to 2016. Finally, we investigated the role of individual heterogeneity among dogs
and the effect of targeted vaccination strategies.
Materials and methods
Contact network data collection
Contact network data was collected in three districts of N’Djame´na, Chad, using 300 geo-
located contact sensors (GCS) developed specifically for this study. The devices contain Global
Positioning System (GPS) modules to track the location and movements of dogs and Ultra-
High-Frequency (UHF) technology sensors to measure close-proximity events between dogs.
The GCS devices record locations at one minute intervals. For the contact recording, the
devices broadcast beacons at one minute intervals and constantly scan for beacons ensuring
that no contacts with durations of at least one minute will be missed. Close proximity events
were defined as records with a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) of more than -75dBm.
Static tests of the devices showed that, independently of the angle between two devices, all con-
tacts closer than 25 cm are registered when signal strength is above that value (S1 Fig).
Collars fitted with the devices were placed on free roaming domestic dogs in three city dis-
tricts (Table 1, Fig 1) with different dog densities (low, medium and high), that were easily
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accessible. The zones were chosen to include urban and peri-urban areas. Data were collected
during the dry season in December 2016. In the selected districts, all dog-owning households
in a pre-defined area of 1km2 were identified in order to capture as many of the contacts
between dogs as possible, bearing in mind that only contacts between dogs that both wear a
sensor can be captured. Dog owners were asked to enroll their pets. Only one dog owner
refused to participate in the study. The GCS units remained on the dogs for 3.5 days. After
retrieval of the GCS units, dogs were vaccinated against rabies. We excluded study zone 3 from
the network analysis due to the low proportion of devices usable for analysis.
The data from the contact sensors were used to establish an empirical contact network,
where the nodes correspond to the dogs and any two nodes are connected by an edge if at least
one contact between the two dogs was registered. S2 Fig. shows the number of edges in the
empirical network during different subintervals of the study period.
Table 1. Characteristics of the three study zones. The reason for the discrepancy between the number of dogs and the number of deployed devices is that some collars
could not be attached because dogs resisted. In study zone 1 the number of deployed devices was also limited by the fact that we had only 300 devices at our disposal. The
discrepancy between deployed and usable devices is due to broken or lost GCS units, battery failure or failure in the data downloading process.
zone district location dog density number of dogs deployed devices devices usable for analysis
1 6 urban high 328 290 237
2 1 peri-urban medium 94 80 66
3 8 urban low 59 41 25
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.t001
Fig 1. The location of the three study zones (red squares) and Chagoua and Abena quarters (green rectangle) in
N’Djamena. The solid purple line denotes the border to Cameroun. The maps were generated using OpenStreetMap
contributors.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g001
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Rabies cases data
Surveillance of canine rabies in N’Djame´na consists of passive reporting of cases confirmed
with an immunofluorescence antibody test (IFAT). In 2012, prior to the vaccination campaign,
there was, on average, one case of dog rabies per week. After the vaccination campaigns in
2012 and 2013, no rabies cases were reported for nine months. In October 2014, new rabies
cases were reported in district number 9, south of the Chari River. In January 2016, the first
case north of the river was reported in the Chagoua quarter of district 6 (Fig 1). An additional
6 cases of dog rabies were reported in 2016 in Chagoua and the neighboring Abena quarter.
Dog population estimates
We simulated rabies incursion into Chagoua and Abena quarters to compare the model results
to the outbreak data. Dog population estimates were derived from the 2012 mass vaccination
campaign coverage assessment to determine the number of nodes in the network. A total of
2775 dogs were vaccinated during the 2012 campaign in Chagoua, Abena and the neighboring
Dembe quarters [5]. A capture-mark-recapture model estimated vaccination coverage in that
area at 67%. In a second stage of the campaign, additional dogs were vaccinated in Chagoua,
Abena and Dembe. During the latter stage, the proportion of dogs originating from Chagoua
and Abena was assessed at 86% of dogs. Assuming that this proportion was the same in the
first round, we estimated the dog population in Chagoua and Abena to total 3,500 dogs. This
was confirmed through a household survey conducted after the vaccination campaign, which
estimated the dog/human ratio to be 1/20. The proportion of ownerless dogs was between 8%
and 15% [5]. The total human population in Chagoua and Abena was 72,000 people.
Network construction
We developed a spatially explicit network construction algorithm to expand the empirical con-
tact network to a synthetic network with more nodes, which allows for more realistic simula-
tions of rabies transmission. When applied to a set of nodes of the same size as the empirical
network, this algorithm generated a network with a similar degree distribution. The outbreak
probability and size of a rabies transmission model on the empirical and the synthetic network
were similar, meaning we captured the features of the empirical network which are relevant
for disease transmission in the construction algorithm.
The steps of the algorithm to create the synthetic network are described below. We first cre-
ate a graph with n nodes and zero edges. The number of nodes n corresponds to the number
of nodes in the empirical network. Each node is assigned a position consisting of x and y coor-
dinates in a square. The coordinates are sampled using Latin Hypercube sampling. Any two
nodes i and j are connected with a probability pij given by pij = exp(−κΔij), where Δij is the
Euclidean distance between node i and node j and κ is a scaling parameter. Next a proportion
1 − τ of the nodes are selected uniformly at random. For each node i in that subset of nodes a
number m is sampled from a Poisson distribution with mean λ. The node i is then connected
to exactly m other nodes out of all the nodes in the graph. The probability of selecting node j
into the m nodes is given by ~pij ¼
kjPn
l¼1
kl
, where kj is the degree of node j and
Pn
l¼1 kl is the
sum of the degrees of all the nodes in the graph.
The three scaling parameters, κ, τ and λ are chosen such that the Kolmogorov distance
between the degree distribution of the synthetic network and the degree distribution of the
empirical network is minimal. We minimize the Kolmogorov distance by using a gridsearch
and confirm the results by minimizing a second metric, the χ2 distance. The optimal values of
the parameters κ, τ and λ for the two study zones are displayed in Table 2. Larger networks are
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constructed by choosing the desired number of nodes in the networks and following the steps
described above with the optimal values for λ, τ and κ. The properties of the empirical and the
synthetic networks are displayed in Table 3. When optimizing the parameters κ, τ and λ only
the degree distribution of the two networks is taken into account. Therefore, other network
properties such as clustering do not necessarily align between the synthetic and the empirical
network.
Transmission model
We used an individual based transmission model to simulate the spread of rabies in a contact
network. All nodes of the network are assigned a status; susceptible, exposed, infective or
removed. Nodes infect adjacent nodes with a transmission rate β and progress from exposed
to infectious and from infectious to removed with average transition periods σ and δ. For
each infected dog the individual incubation period and infectious period is sampled from a
Poisson distribution, with mean σ or δ, respectively. The model ignores birth and natural
mortality. The parameter values are displayed in Table 4. The incubation period, σ, is chosen
from recent literature [37] and fits with the observed time between cases in the incidence
data from Chagoua and Abena. The duration of the incubation period is only marginally rel-
evant for our simulations, because it only affects the outbreak duration and not the outbreak
probability or size. The infectious period, δ, is chosen based on the assumption that a rabid
Table 2. Optimal values for the three scaling parameters of the network construction algorithm for the two study
zones. The optimal values minimize the distance between the degree distributions of the empirical and the simulated
networks. The distance is calculated using the Kolmogorov or the Chi-Square metric.
λ τ κ
Zone 1 Kolmogorov 24 0.75 25
Chi-Square 23 0.75 25
Zone 2 Kolmogorov 7 0.7 10
Chi-Square 6 0.7 11
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.t002
Table 3. Properties of the empirical and the synthetic contact networks for the two study zones. For the synthetic network five point summary statistics of 1000 runs of
the construction algorithm are displayed.
empirical synthetic
min p25 p50 p75 max
Zone 1 nodes 237 237
edges 1739 1630 1756 1782 1812 1914
density 0.0622 0.0582 0.0628 0.0637 0.0648 0.0684
av. degree 14.68 13.8 14.8 15.0 15.3 16.2
max. degree 64 39 46 48 50 67
clustering 0.562 0.129 0.157 0.164 0.172 0.198
Zone 2 nodes 66 66
edges 272 238 280 292 305 365
density 0.125 0.111 0.131 0.136 0.142 0.170
av. degree 8.24 7.2 8.5 8.8 9.2 11.1
max. degree 19 19 20 21 29
clustering 0.516 0.159 0.230 0.246 0.263 0.339
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.t003
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dog in an urban setting would be killed earlier than a natural death from rabies. Our observa-
tion that more than two thirds of all samples tested at the rabies laboratory are positive sup-
ports the hypothesis that people are likely to recognize the symptoms of rabies since they are
less likely to send non-rabid dogs for testing. If people recognise rabies they are more likely
to kill rabid dogs. [4]. The transmission rate is chosen using Eq (1). We calculated the mean
and variance of the empirical degree distribution, choosing the transmission rate such that
R0 is smaller or equal than 1. We reasoned that rabies is endemic in N’Djame´na, with a con-
stant low number of cases and no large outbreaks observed. The transmission rate choice is
further supported by the comparison of the simulation results to the outbreak data from
Chagoua and Abena.
Network construction validation
We used an individual based transmission model to test whether the properties of the empiri-
cal and the reconstructed network lead to similar outbreak probability and size for different
transmission rates. The results for 1000 simulation runs of this model on the empirical and the
synthetic network are shown in Fig 2. We differentiate between minor outbreaks, which are
outbreaks where more than one and less than one percent of the nodes gets infected, and
major outbreaks, which are outbreaks where more than one percent of the nodes get infected.
Incursions denote all outbreaks where more than one node gets infected and therefore include
both minor and major outbreaks. The figure suggests the construction algorithm performs
well since the empirical and the simulated network yield similar results in outbreak probability
and size. The values of the proportion of simulation runs with outbreaks correspond to the val-
ues of the average relative outbreak size, that is the sum of all the final outbreak sizes divided
by the number of nodes in the network and the number of simulation runs. This is consistent
with the theoretical result that the probability of a major outbreak and the relative size of such
a major outbreak are equal [38]. This holds despite the clustering of the synthetic network
being higher than in a random graph due to the spatial component of the network construc-
tion algorithm. In Fig 2 the outbreak size increases steeply for transmission rate values that are
slightly larger than 0.02. This is consistent with the basic reproductive ratio R0 given by
R0 ¼ p mþ
varðDÞ   m
m
 
; ð1Þ
where p is the transmission probability given a contact and μ and var(D) are the expected
value and the variance of the degree distribution [38]. In the case of the described network R0
takes the value of 1 if the transmission rate β is 0.02. Since major outbreaks are only possible
when R0 is greater than one, the observed increase of the average outbreak size for values of
the transmission probability greater than 0.02 aligns well with the theoretical result, even
though not all conditions are met in the case of the described networks.
Table 4. Parameters of the rabies transmission model. Time is measured in days.
Description Unit Distribution Range / Mean
σ incubation period time Poisson 90
δ infectious period time Poisson 2
β transmission rate time-1 Uniform [0.015, 0.02]
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.t004
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Results
The empirical contact networks
In study zone 1, the network consisted of 237 nodes and 1739 edges, with an average degree of
15 and and maximal degree of 64. In zone 2, the network consisted of 66 nodes and 272 edges,
with an average degree of 9 and a maximum degree of 20. In both zones, nearly all dogs were
part of one connected component, that is a sub-graph where any two nodes are connected by
a path. The network can be divided into communities using a modularity optimization algo-
rithm [39]. This algorithm optimizes both, the number of communities and the assignment
of each node to a specific community, such that the modularity, that is the density of links
within communities compared to links between communities, takes the maximum possible
value. When the network of study zone 1 is divided into communities using this algorithm it
becomes visually obvious that communities mainly consist of dogs which live close together
and do not frequently crossrange across roads with traffic (Fig 3). This suggests, that roads
with high traffic intensity constitute a functional barrier which substantially reduces contact
between dogs residing on either side.
Comparing simulation results to outbreak data
Rabies was absent from the Chagoua and Abena quarters of N’Djame´na for more than a year
prior to the outbreak in 2016. The 7 cases were the first to occur north of the Chari River.
Fig 2. Outbreak probabilities and sizes of the transmission model on the empirical and the constructed network in study zone 1. In each simulation run, one
randomly chosen dog is infected from the outside. The simulation ends when there is no more transmission. The incursion probability is the proportion of simulation
runs where the number of infected dogs was greater than one. The probability of a minor outbreak is the proportion of simulation runs where more than one dog and
less than 1 percent of the population get infected. The major outbreak probability is the proportion of simulation runs where more than 1 percent of the population get
infected. The outbreak size is the cumulative proportion of infected dogs over the whole course of the infection. In the left panel the lines correspond to the mean over
1000 simulation runs for each value of the transmission rate. In the right panel the lines correspond to the median over 1000 simulation runs for each value of the
transmission rate and the shaded area corresponds to the interquartile range.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g002
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PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680 August 1, 2018 8 / 18
Chagoua and Abena are virtually separated from other quarters to the west, north and east
by main traffic roads and to the south by the Chari River. The area of these two quarters is
approximately 4km2, and the total number of dogs is estimated to be around 3,500. We simu-
late the course of the infection after the incursion of one rabid dog. We found that in 450 out
of 1000 simulations the chain of transmission was longer than 1, in other words additional
dogs get infected. Among these chains of transmission the median of the cumulative incidence
of all simulation runs aligns well with the cases observed in Chagoua and Abena (Fig 4). This
suggests that the transmission rate in our model is a reasonable choice and that our simula-
tions yield realistic results. Since rabies is often underreported, the true number of cases is
likely to be higher than the reported number of cases. We accounted for this in a sensitivity
analysis on the reporting probability (S3 Fig). We found that if more than 60% of the cases are
reported, the median of the simulations does not differ more from the incidence data than
with perfect reporting. The final outbreak sizes are shown in S4 Fig.
Outbreak probability, size and duration for different vaccination coverages
To assess the impact of vaccination coverage on the outbreak probability and size after the
introduction of one rabid dog, we constructed a network with a large number of nodes. We
considered a 4 × 4 kilometer square and a dog population with the same density as the dog
Fig 3. Contact network and home location of the 237 dogs in study zone 1. In the left panel each node corresponds to a dog. The size of the node is proportional to
the degree of the node and the color corresponds to the community the node belongs to. Contacts between dogs are shown as grey lines. In the right panel each dot on
the map corresponds to a home location of a dog. The colors correspond to the community in the network. The maps were generated using OpenStreetMap
contributors.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g003
Dog contact networks and rabies transmission
PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680 August 1, 2018 9 / 18
population in study zone 1, which yields a network with 4930 nodes. We ran rabies incursion
simulations on that network. The outbreak probabilitiy, size and duration across different vac-
cination coverage are shown in Fig 5. The probability of a major outbreak, defined as more
than 1% of the dog population becoming infected, is substantially reduced when vaccination
coverage is above 70%. The probability of minor outbreaks also decreases with vaccination
coverage, but only reaches zero with nearly complete vaccination coverage. Even though a
minor outbreak, by definition, could affect up to 1% of the population (50 dogs) the simulated
average outbreak size is, in fact, very low. This is consistent with the theoretical result that the
final number of infected nodes converges to a two point distribution. A proportion of simula-
tion runs stays close to zero whereas the other proportion ends up near the major outbreak
size (for an example see S5 Fig). The minor outbreaks, therefore, only capture the short chains
of transmission. These chains include, on average, 5 dogs and last approximately 20 weeks,
yielding an average number of one infected dog per month which aligns well with the observed
endemic situation in N’Djame´na [4].
Time to resurgence
After the vaccination campaigns in 2012 and 2013, no rabies cases were reported north of the
Chari River until October 2014. We used a deterministic model [3] to estimate vaccination
coverage over time and the contact network model to calculate outbreak probability for the
respective coverage. Comparing these probabilities with the incidence data (Fig 6) showed
that the first case after the vaccination campaigns could not establish a chain of transmission
because the probability for a major outbreak was very low at that time. Later, in February
2016, the respective probability was higher which could explain the subsequent cases.
Fig 4. Incidence data and simulation results for the quarters Chagoua and Abena in 2016. The red line is the cumulative number
of confirmed rabies cases. The black lines show median and quartiles the cumulative number of cases in simulation runs where the
number of rabid dogs was greater than 1. Individual simulation runs are displayed as gray lines.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g004
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Fig 5. Outbreak probability, size and duration on a network of 4930 dogs for different vaccination coverages. In each simulation run, a proportion of the dogs is
randomly assigned the status vaccinated and one randomly chosen susceptible dog is infected from the outside. The simulation ends when there is no more
transmission. Simulation runs where more than one dog gets infected are classified as incursion. Simulation runs where more than one dog and less than 1% of the
population get infected are classified as minor outbreaks. Simulation runs where more than 1% of the population gets infected are classified as major outbreaks.
Incursions include minor and major outbreaks. The outbreak probability is the proportion of simulation runs with outbreaks. The outbreak size is the cumulative
proportion of infected dogs over the whole course of the infection. The outbreak duration is the number of weeks until the last infected dog dies. In the left panel the
lines correspond to the mean over 1000 simulation runs for each value of the vaccination coverage. In the center and the right panel the lines correspond to the mean
over 1000 simulation runs for each value of the vaccination coverage and the shaded areas correspond to the interquartile ranges. The axis of the indented figure in the
center panel are the same as in the surrounding figure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g005
Fig 6. Outbreak probabilities and rabies cases north of the river Chari from 2012 and 2016. For each week the
vaccination coverage was calculated using a deterministic transmission model. Vaccination coverages were then
translated to outbreak probabilities using the contact network model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g006
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Comparing vaccination strategies
We used the empirical contact network from zone 1 to compare different types of vaccina-
tion strategies. Dogs can be vaccinated at random or in a targeted way, based on the contact
network structure among the dogs or based on the movements of the dogs. We considered
four different ways of targeting dogs: (i) vaccination in order of the degree centrality of the
nodes, (ii) vaccination in order of the betweenness centrality of the nodes, (iii) vaccinating
each node with a probability that is linearly proportional to the average distance the corre-
sponding dog spent away from the home location of the owner and (iv) vaccinating each
node with a probability that is linearly proportional to the area covered by the corresponding
dog, where the area was estimated by fitting a minimal convex polygon to the GPS locations
of the dog. The outbreak probability and size for each type of vaccination and different cov-
erages are shown in Fig 7. Consistent with previous findings [40, 41] we observed that tar-
geted vaccination reduces the outbreak probability and size more than random vaccination.
Targeting nodes by degree yields a lower outbreak probability and size than targeting
nodes by betweenness. The betweenness centrality of a node i is the proportion of shortest
paths between any pair of nodes in the network that pass through node i. Nodes with high
betweenness centrality are therefore part of many short paths between nodes, which is why
removing them affects the global network structure and reduces the size of the largest com-
ponent, while targeting nodes by degree operates on a local level and reduces the total num-
ber of edges more rapidly. In our case, chains on average are short, so the local structure is
Fig 7. Outbreak probability and size for random and targeted vaccination and different coverages. For each coverage a fraction of nodes is considered as
immunized and therefore removed from the network. These nodes are chosen either randomly (blue lines), in descending order of degree (red lines) or descending
order of betweenness (yellow line). To simulate the effect of oral vaccination, the probability of a node being immunized was chosen to be linearly proportional to the
average distance from the home location (purple line) or the area of the minimal convex polygon fitted into the gps logs (green line). The centrality values of the nodes
are recalculated after each node removal. For each strategy and coverage 1000 simulation runs are conducted.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g007
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more important than the global structure. Vaccination based on movement also reduces the
outbreak probability and sizes.
Sensitivity analysis
We conducted a Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient (PRCC) sensitivity analysis [42] to assess
the impact of the network construction and transmission model parameters on the model out-
put, with ranges as displayed in S1 Table. The results are shown in Fig 8. The most sensitive
parameter is τ, a scaling parameter of the network construction algorithm. For low values of τ,
a large proportion of nodes are sampled to connect both to spatially close nodes and any other
node in the network. These nodes have a higher degree and betweenness centrality than the
other nodes in the network, resulting in an overall larger outbreak size and duration. The
remaining two network construction parameters, κ and λ, do not have a large effect on the
model output. Among the parameters of the transmission model the infectious period, δ, is
most sensitive. Since the model ignores birth and natural mortality, the incubation period σ is
only relevant for the outbreak duration and not for the outbreak size. A sensitivity analysis of
the outbreak probability, size and duration for different vaccination coverages is shown in S6
and S7 Figs.
Discussion
This study used empirical contact data to develop a contact network model of dog rabies trans-
mission. We validated the simulation results with 2016 outbreak data from N’Djame´na. We
used the model to compare the probability of rabies establishment after incursion across differ-
ent vaccination coverage. We showed that vaccination coverage above 70% prevents major
outbreaks, which is consistent with previous findings [3].
In contrast to deterministic models, our individual-based model allowed us to investigate
the whole possibility space of outbreak scenarios. Differentiating between minor and major
outbreaks revealed that even though the probability of major outbreaks is very low for high
Fig 8. Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient sensitivity analysis of the outbreak size and outbreak duration. The
parameter κ is a network construction parameter involved in the scaling of the spatial connection. The parameter τ is a
network construction parameter that alters the proportion of far roaming dogs. The parameter λ is a network
construction parameter that alters the mean number of peers of far roaming dogs. The parameter δ is the infectious
period. The parameter σ is the incubation period. The parameter β is the transmission rate.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680.g008
Dog contact networks and rabies transmission
PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006680 August 1, 2018 13 / 18
vaccination coverage, minor outbreaks can still occur even at nearly complete vaccination cov-
erage. These minor rabies outbreaks consist of approximately 5 dogs, which aligns well with
current observations from N’Djame´na [4]. The endemicity of rabies in N’Djame´na could be
explained as a series of rabies introductions with subsequent minor rabies outbreaks, as has
been observed in Bangui [43].
We showed that targeting dogs by degree centrality, betweenness centrality or based on
their movement substantially increases the impact of vaccination. Targeted vaccination based
on betweenness centrality does not perform better than targeted vaccination based on degree
centrality. The observation that vaccination by degree performs as well as vaccination accord-
ing to other network centralities is consistent with previous findings in humans [41]. The
degree or betweenness centrality can only be assessed using expensive methods like the tagging
with geo-located contact sensors conducted in this study. Such methods cannot be used in rou-
tine surveillance. We have shown that vaccination based on movement also reduces the out-
break probabilities and sizes. This might indicate that oral vaccination would be an effective
intervention because dogs which cover a lot of territory would be more likely to encounter oral
vaccine baits. Oral vaccination has been shown to effectively prevent rabies in dogs [44] and is
currently recommended by the WHO as a complementary measure to increase coverage in
mass vaccination campaigns [45]. Oral vaccination must be carefully planned with regard to
biosafety, for example by assuring that vaccinators retrieve unconsumed baits [46]. It has been
successfully implemented to eliminate fox rabies in central Europe [47]. Further consideration
of oral vaccination of dogs is warranted based on these results.
We observed a dog population where only a few dogs were not part of the largest compo-
nent, similar to Hirsch et. al [33], who used proximity loggers to reveal a highly connected
population in raccons.
In contrast to the raccoon rabies model of Reynolds et. al. [34], which concluded that with
vaccination coverage of 65% the probability of a large outbreak remains around 60–80%, we
noted a substantial drop in the probability of a major outbreak. This might be due to the fact
that, while raccoons remain infectious until death from rabies, we assumed that dogs remain
rabid for only two days on average because we hypothesized that in an urban setting a rabid
dog would be killed by the community. Therefore, major rabies outbreaks could be prevented
by rabies awareness and locally reactive interventions.
Unlike Du¨rr et al. [35] who found that even at a vaccination coverage of 70% approximately
half the dog population dies from rabies, we found outbreak sizes of less than 1% of the popu-
lation for high vaccination coverage. This might be due to the fact that Du¨rr et al. considered
reactive vaccination after incursion rather than preventive vaccination.
There are several limitations to our study. Our simulations are based on the assumption
that rabid dogs stay infective for two days on average, which does not consider the fact, that
rabid dogs can be infectious for several days before they show symptoms. Previous models of
rabies in wildlife indicated an effect of seasonality on outbreak sizes and durations. Collecting
contact data at different times of the year is currently planned, and subsequent analyses will
explore the impact of seasonality on contact rates. Dog contacts were only measured for a
period of 3.5 days, the extent of battery life. While this observation window is longer than the
average infectious period, we cannot be certain that the structure of the network would remain
the same when measured for a longer time. Also, contacts with untagged owned dogs and
unowned dogs (approx. 8% to 15% of the dog population) were not recorded. Furthermore,
we did not include the change of behavior of a rabid animal. However, Reynolds et. al. [34]
found that assuming a combination of paralytic and furious rabies in the population leads to
little quantitative change in the outbreak size.
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We found that major rabies outbreaks are unlikely when vaccination coverage is above
70%. Our results suggest that the endemicity of rabies in N’Djame´na might be explained as a
series of importations with subsequent minor outbreaks. Further investigation of determinants
of dog roaming and contact behavior could inform potential targeted vaccination strategies.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Signal strength of contacts between devices in a static test in N’Djame´na. The
devices were set up on the ground in a circular arrangement around a central device and con-
tact were recorded for different distances over a period of 1 hour per distance. The colors cor-
respond to different angles from the central device (black dot).
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Contacts over time in study zone 1. For each 1 hour interval during the study period,
ranging from Saturday 17:00 to Tuesday 7:00, the number of edges in the network is shown.
The network for each 1 hour interval was constructed based on all contacts recorded during that
interval and an edge was established if at least one contact between the two dogs was registered.
(TIF)
S3 Fig. Sensitivity analysis of the simulation results for Chagoua and Abena on the proba-
bility of detecting rabid dogs. For each value of the transmission rate (ranging from 0.015
to 0.02 with steps of 0.01) 1000 simulation runs were conducted. Each case in the simulated
incidence was randomly assigned as either reported or not reported for different values of
the reporting probability (ranging from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.1). The color of each pixel corre-
sponds to the maximum absolute difference between the median of the simulated reported
cumulative incidence and the outbreak data.
(TIF)
S4 Fig. Final outbreak size of the simulations in the quarters Chagoua and Abena.
(TIF)
S5 Fig. Final outbreak size of the simulations on a network of 4930 dogs, showing the two
point distribution expected from theory.
(TIF)
S6 Fig. Sensitivity analysis of the outbreak probability, duration and size. The colors corre-
spond to different vaccination coverages. For each vaccination coverage and parameter value
the mean of 1000 simulation runs is shown. Simulation runs where more than one dog gets
infected are classified as incursion. Simulation runs where more than one dog and less than
1% of the population get infected are classified as minor outbreaks. Simulation runs where
more than 1% of the population gets infected are classified as major outbreaks. Incursions
include minor and major outbreaks.
(TIF)
S7 Fig. Sensitivity analysis of the outbreak probability, duration and size. The colors corre-
spond to different vaccination coverages. For each vaccination coverage and parameter value
the mean of 1000 simulation runs is shown. Simulation runs where more than one dog gets
infected are classified as incursion. Simulation runs where more than one dog and less than
1% of the population get infected are classified as minor outbreaks. Simulation runs where
more than 1% of the population gets infected are classified as major outbreaks. Incursions
include minor and major outbreaks.
(TIF)
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S1 Table. Parameter ranges for the PRCC sensitivity analysis.
(PDF)
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